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The Background of Federal Rules
611(b) and 607
I. INTRODUCTION
I am honored to participate in a discussion of evidence dedi-
cated to David Dow, who has contributed more to the development
of the Nebraska law of evidence than any one person. I have cho-
sen to discuss only two sections of the Federal and Nebraska
Rules: (1) cross-examination of parties and witnesses,' and (2) a
party's right to impeach a witness called by the party.2
II. THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
An Advisory Committee was appointed in 1965 to draft Federal
Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates.3
The Advisory Committee's members included more lawyers in the
active trial practice than did the committee which drafted the
Model Code of Evidence in 1939 or the committee which drafted
the Uniform Code adopted in 1953. Trial lawyers were in the ma-
jority by nine to six; eight of the Committee were members of the
American College of Trial Lawyers. 4 The contribution of the trial
bar to these rules was thus of major importance. When originally
appointed, three members of the Committee were teachers of evi-
dence in law schools and three were judges. 5 During the Commit-
* Senior Judge, United States District Court for the District of Nebraska.
1. FED. R. EviD. 611(b); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-611(2) (Reissue 1975).
2. FED. R. EviD. 607; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-607 (Reissue 1975).
3. The Advisory Committee [hereinafter referred to as the Committee] con-
sisted of Albert E. Jenner (Chairman), Professor Edward W. Cleary (re-
porter), and members David Berger, Hicks Epton, Robert S. Erdahl, Egbert
L Haywood, Frank G. Raichle, Herman F. Selvin, Craig Spangenberg and Ed-
ward Bennett Williams (who were active trial lawyers), Professors Thomas
F. Green, Jr., Charles W. Joiner and Jack B. Weinstein, and Federal Judges
Simon E. Sobeloff, Joe Ewing Estes, and Robert Van Pelt.
4. 46 F.R.D. 173 (1969) (Transmittal letter of the Advisory Committee's Prelimi-
nary Draft of Rules of Evidence to Albert B. Mars, Chairman, Standing Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United
States).
5. See note 3 supra.
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tee's existence two of the teachers, Weinstein and Joiner, were
appointed federal district court judges. 6
III CROSS-EXAMINATION OF PARTIES AND WITNESSES
There are at least three recognized rules of cross-examination:
1. The limited or restrictive rule limits cross-examination
either of the adverse party or a witness to matters about
which the person has testified on direct examination.
This rule was first employed in the United States in 1827
in an opinion by Chief Judge Gibson of Pennsylvania, 7
and is also known as the "federal rule."
2. The rule of wide-open cross-examination permits cross-
examination upon any subject relevant to any of the is-
sues in the entire case and is not limited to topics which
the examiner has chosen to open on direct examination.
This is frequently called the "English rule. '8
3. The "Michigan rule" forbids cross-examination con-
cerning matters relating to the cross-examiner's affirm-
ative case unless these matters were raised in the
examination in chief.9
The Committee's discussion centered on the federal and English
rules. The Michigan rule did not have Committee support.
A discussion of the state of the law relating to examination and
cross-examination of witnesses and parties when the Advisory
Committee began its work in 1965 may be helpful. The more re-
cent history can begin with Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The American Bar Association's Committee for the
Improvement of the Law of Evidence for the year 1937-38 reported:
The rule limiting cross-examination to the precise subject of the direct
examination is probably the most frequent rule (except the Opinion rule)
leading in trial practice today to refined and technical quibbles which ob-
struct the progress of the trial, confuse the jury, and give rise to appeal on
technical grounds only. Some of the instances in which Supreme Courts
6. Professor Weinstein was appointed a Judge of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York on April 15, 1967. Professor
Charles W. Joiner was appointed a Judge of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan on June 9, 1972.
7. Ellmaker v. Buckley, 16 Serg. & Rawl. 72,77 (Pa. 1827). For further history, see
Houghton v. Jones, 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 702 (1863); Philadelphia & Trenton R.R. v.
Stimpson, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 448 (1840); Floyd v. Bovard, 6 Watts & Serg. 75 (Pa.
1843); 1 S. GREENLEAF, GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE § 445 (16th ed. 1899).
8. See Moody v. Rowell, 34 Mass. (17 Pick.) 490 (1835); AiuZ. R EviD. 611(b) (a
witness may be cross-examined on any relevant matter).
9. See Campau v. Dewey, 9 Mich. 381 (1861) (Christiancy, J., dissenting); C. Mc-
CoRMcK, EVIDENCE § 21, at 46-48 (2d ed. 1972); Comment, 36 U. DET. IUJ. 162
(1958).
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have ordered new trials for the mere transgression of this rule about the
order of evidence have been astounding.
We recommend that the rule allowing questions upon any part of the
issue known to the witness ... be adopted. 10
In the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as adopted in 1938, Rule
43(b) provided:
A party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile witness by leading
questions. A party may call an adverse party or an officer, director, or
managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or
association which is an adverse party, and interrogate him by leading
questions and contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been
called by the adverse party, and the witness thus called may be contra-
dicted and impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party also, and may
be cross-examined by the adverse party only upon the subject matter of
his examination in chief.1 1
This provision represented a compromise of the conflicting views
among the "rulemakers." The Advisory Committee drafting the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had been undecided as to
whether evidence was a substantive or procedural matter and thus
on whether the Supreme Court "had any power to promulgate
rules of evidence.' 2
Judge Mars, in Moyer v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,13 gave the
history of Rule 44(b) (later to be renumbered 43(b)) and told of an
Advisory Committee proposal relevant to the issue here discussed:
In the final report of the Advisory Committee made in November, 1937,
proposed Rule 44 included the provision that "Except as stated in the last
preceding sentence, any witness called by a party and examined as to any
matter material to any issue may be cross-examined by the adverse party
upon all matters material to every issue of the action." The Supreme
Court, however, rejected these proposals. The only reference to the sub-
ject in the rules as adopted is in Rule 43(b) which provides that an adverse
party or officer, director or managing agent of an adverse corporate party
called by the other party "may be cross-examined by the adverse party
only upon the subject matter of his examination in chief."1 4
Judge Marls, referring to the failure of the Supreme Court to
adopt the Committee version, further stated: "By its failure to pro-
mulgate the rule proposed by the Advisory Committee the
Supreme Court indicated that the historic limitation upon the
scope of cross-examination to the subject matter of the direct ex-
10. 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 143.10 (2d ed. 1964), transferred to and adapted
in 10 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 611.05[5] (2d ed. 1976) (evidence volume).
11. FED. R. CIrv. P. 43(b). This rule was abrogated upon passage by Congress of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L No. 93-595, § 2076, 88
Stat. 1926 (effective July 1, 1975).
12. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIvIL § 2401,
at 308 (1971).
13. 126 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1942).
14. Id. at 143.
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amination is still to be enforced in the federal courts."'15
This discussion continued when the American Law Institute's
Model Code of Evidence was drafted. Work on the Model Code
had started in February, 1939. A proposed draft was submitted in
1940 and 1941. The final draft proposed in February, 1942, and re-
vised in May, 1943, was then adopted as the American Law Insti-
tute Model Code of Evidence. Rule 105(h) made the extent of
cross-examination subject to judicial discretion.16 It is interesting
to note that'the stated purpose of the rules concerning the scope of
cross-examination under the Model Code was to produce "an hon-
est, expeditious and understandable presentation of admissible
evidence.' 17
Subsequently the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws began its work on uniform rules of evidence
which were approved in August, 1953. The Uniform Rules pro-
vided that "No person is disqualified to testify to any matter."' 8
Thus it is not surprising that the reporter in the first draft of Rule
6-14, later to become 611(b), provided: "The scope of cross-exami-
nation is not limited to matters testified to on direct but extends to
all matters material to every issue in the action, including the cred-
ibility of the witness."' 9 At the same time, the reporter submitted
proposed Rule 6-07 to the Committee. The proposed rule permit-
ted the impeachment of one's own witness.2 0
At the Committee's first vote on whether to limit cross-exami-
nation, there was a tie vote when the author and one other mem-
ber, who were not present at the vote, were counted as favoring
limited cross-examination. The chairman thereupon cast the de-
ciding vote making it eight to seven for limited cross-examina-
tion.2 ' Discussion continued both at bar meetings and in the law
reviews.22 Nothing is to be gained by further reference to the
15. Id.
16. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 105(h) (1942).
17. Id. Comment on clause (h).
18. UIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 7(b) (1953).
19. Volume IV B, Advisory Committee on Evidence, Art. VI, Witnesses, Memo
14-B at 141. (First Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence) (1967). It was de-
cided that most of the Committee's correspondence and the discussion drafts
would not be published until the preliminary drafts had been approved for
circulation to the bench and bar. However, the author and other members
each retained personal files. Accordingly, citations to the Committee's ac-
tions refer to the author's personal files and his notes therein and will be
cited hereinafter as author's file.
20. Id. at 86.
21. Author's file, supra note 19, Vol. 5, Advisory Committee Notes and Com-
ments, Memo 18 at 25 (Second Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence) (1967).
22. See generally Green, Highlights of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 4
GA. L. REV. 1 (1969); Symposium on the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
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names of those supporting or opposing the Committee's original
position favoring limited cross-examination.
At the meeting of the Committee when the draft was readied
for submission to the United States Supreme Court, the Commit-
tee had further lively discussion and again a vote was taken on
Rule 611(b). Three members changed their position and by a vote
of eight to seven a draft calling for open cross-examination in civil
cases was approved. Berger and the author and another member
who had supported limited cross-examination on the previous
vote, voted this time for open cross-examination. One other mem-
ber, whose identity is unknown to the author, and who had previ-
ously voted for open cross-examination, changed his vote to favor
limited cross-examination. It is interesting to note, because it em-
phasizes the continuing division of opinion on this subject, that the
Standing Committee of the Judicial Conference also approved
Rule 611(b) by only a one-vote margin, when it approved the Evi-
dence Code and submitted it to the Supreme Court. On both Rule
611 (b) and Rule 607, the Supreme Court approved the proposals of
the Evidence Committee. 23
The arguments presented were the usual ones both pro and
con. Those favoring limited cross-examination argued the consti-
tutional right of a defendant not to incriminate himself and ob-
jected to use by a cross-examiner of leading questions, especially
when by cross-examination he was in effect presenting his own
case. Additionally it was argued that much confusion would result
in letting the cross-examiner present his case by cross-examina-
tion on matters which were outside the scope of direct examina-
tion, while the adverse party was still presenting his case. Limited
cross-examination, it was asserted, had the advantage of orderly
presentation of evidence. 24 The continuous courtroom bickering
and delay which result from discussions as to the scope of direct
examination and subject the trial court to many needless possibili-
ties of error were advanced as reasons to support the rule
change.2 5 The vouching-for-a-witness rule,26 earlier advanced as a
reason for limited cross-examination, lost influence, at least with
the author, when proposed Rule 607, rejecting the "voucher" rule,
(pts. 1-2), 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1061 (1969) & 16 WAYNE L. REV. 135 (1969); Pro-
ceedings of the Judicial Conference for the Second Circuit, 48 F.R.D. 39 (1969).
23. For the Supreme Court's order, see 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing), and note 45 infra.
24. See author's file, supra note 19, passim.
25. Id.
26. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 38, at 75 (the rule provides that a party
vouches for the "trustworthiness" of a witness when the witness is called to
testify).
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was adopted.27 There were many other arguments pro and con.
Suffice it to say here, that although votes were changed on the
Committee during the course of the many discussions between the
first and last votes, the changes were not the result of any new
arguments.
Without debate the House of Representatives struck Rule
611(b) as submitted by the Supreme Court and inserted the 1969
Committee draft version, 28 saying in a Committee report that it
was a "return to the rule which prevails in the federal courts and
thirty-nine State jurisdictions. '29 The Standing Committee of the
Judicial Conference and the Advisory Committee objected without
avail. It was not surprising that the Senate Committee went along
with the House version.30 It must be conceded that the rule
adopted by the Congress expresses the viewpoint of the majority
of lawyers.
Professor Dow, in his work on the Nebraska Committee, fa-
vored, I am told, the wide-open rule. However, when Congress
made its change, the Nebraska proposed draft was changed to fol-
low the draft approved by the Congress.3 1 This article is not writ-
ten to settle the controversy. The author would still favor the
wide-open rule except in criminal cases until the constitutional is-
sue is settled. I am certain only that this is not the last time a law
review will make mention of the subject.
IV. A PARTY'S RIGHT TO IMPEACH HIS OWN WITNESS
Rule 607 changed the voucher rule32 and thus permitted im-
peachment by the party calling the witness. It reads: "The credi-
27. See text accompanying notes 33 & 54-56 infra.
28. This was the "traditional rule" which limited "cross-examination to credibil-
ity and to matters testified to on direct examination, unless the judge permits
more, in which event the cross-examiner must proceed as if on direct exami-
nation." H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7075, 7085.
29. Id.
30. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7051, 7071.
31. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-611(2) (Reissue 1975). But see NEBRASKA SUPREME
COURT COMMITrEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PROPOSED NEBRASKA RULES
OF EVIDENCE 101 (1973), in which rule 611(b) was of the wide-open type. The
Comment to subdivision "b" indicates that this is a wider rule than that for-
merly used in Nebraska and that the use of the wider rule was prompted by
"considerations of economy, of time and orderliness of trial." Id. at 102.
The Nebraska Evidence Code is not identical to the federal code on all
matters. This note is unnecessary for those who know Professor Dow and
others of the Nebraska Committee. They were not a rubber stamp commit-
tee and any of them could have served well on the federal committee.
32. See note 26 & accompanying text supra.
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bility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the
party calling him."33 Such a change in the voucher rule found sup-
port with a majority of the scholars and from a few courts as early
as 1936. That year both Dean Ladd34 and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, speaking through Judge
Sanborn,5 without reference to each other, had concluded that a
change was needed.
The second circuit, in a widely cited case,36 and without men-
tioning the earlier eighth circuit case, stated its "repudiation of the
pernicious rule against impeachment of one's witness"' 37 and has
received much credit for its part in the rejection of the rule. Dean
Ladd, Judge Sanborn and Judge Lumbard, who authored the sec-
ond circuit opinion, are each in their own right great scholars and
all are entitled to be mentioned when naming those who brought
about this change.
In the April, 1937, draft as amended by its final report in Novem-
ber, 1937, the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure framed Rule 43 (b) 3 8 "in terms of permitting prior incon-
sistent statements to impeach a witness, irrespective of calling
party considerations, but the Supreme Court struck the modifica-
tion. ' 39
The sentence disapproved by the Supreme Court read: "A party
may show that any witness whether called by him or by an adverse
party, has previously made, under oath or otherwise, statements
contradictory to his testimony ....
The Model Code4 ' and the Uniform Rules 42 had each proposed
changes in the voucher rule. Thus it is not surprising that Rule 607
was adopted by the Committee in the form first proposed by the
reporter.4 3 The author's notes indicate that only one amendment
was offered. The amendment was a motion by Professor Wein-
stein, to strike the words "calling him" and to insert in place
33. FED. R Evw. 607.
34. Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness--New Developments, 4 U. Cm. L.
REV. 69 (1936).
35. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Woelfle, 83 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1936).
36. United States v. Freeman, 302 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1962).
37. Id. at 351.
38. See note 11 & accompanying text supra.
39. Comment, Witnesses Under Article VI of the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 15 WAYNE L REV. 1236, 1266-67 (1969).
40. Thomas, The Rule Against Impeaching One's Own Witness: A
Reconsideration, 31 Mo. L. REV. 364, 385 n.83 (1966); 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1 43.10, at 1347 (2d ed. 1964), transferred to and adapted in 10
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 611.02-.03 (2d ed. 1976) (evidence volume).
41. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106 (1942).
42. UNIFoRM RuLE OF EVIDENCE 20 (1953).
43. For the text of the first proposed draft, see author's file, supra note 19, at 86.
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thereof the words "who in good faith called him." The majority,
including the author, did not support the motion. 44
After the rule was approved by the Committee and the
Supreme Court and during the time it was before the Congress, 45
objection was made to the section by the National Legal Aid and
Defenders' Association. 4 6 They called particular attention to the
possible abuse in criminal cases from such a rule and expressed
the feeling that a party should show both damage and surprise
before being allowed to impeach its own witness.47
The South Carolina chapter of the American Trial Lawyers and
the District of Columbia Conference Committee both expressed
opposition and proposed deletion of the section in its entirety.48
The District of Columbia Conference Committee in the alternative
would have added "in the discretion of the court."49 The Virginia
Trial Lawyers Committee would have added the word "support" as
well as "attacked."50 The Railroad Trial Counsel Committee, the
American College of Trial Lawyers Committee, and the ABA Com-
mittee likewise expressed disagreement with the rule.51 Nothing
is to be gained by further detail as to the objections made. The
Committee's reporter succinctly stated the reason for these differ-
ent opinions, which were related to the Committee in the hope that
these arguments would be presented to the Congress. Upon learn-
ing of the opposition to the rule, he commented that practitioners
generally preferred to adhere to the practice with which they were
familiar and that those expressing their objections almost without
exception had viewed restrictions on the scope of cross-examina-
tion with disfavor.52
During the time the Rules were pending in the Congress, the
Supreme Court decided Chambers v. MissisSippi. 3 In the opinion
44. Id.
45. The Supreme Court, by order on November 20, 1972, prescribed the Federal
Rules of Evidence to be effective July 1, 1973.56 F.R.D. 183 (1973). The Rules
were transmitted to Congress on February 5, 1973. Congress, by Act of
March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9, deferred the effectiveness of the
Rules until expressly approved by Congress.
46. Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Special Sub-
comm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973) (Statement of John J. Cleary, Exec.
Director Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., on behalf of the National Legal
Aid & Defender's Association).
47. Id.
48. See author's file, supra note 19, VoL XVI, Advisory Committee on Evidence,
Reporter's Comments on Suggestions Received at 114.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 115.
52. Statement of Professor Edward W. Cleary (Advisory Committee reporter).
53. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). The case was argued November 15, 1972. The Federal
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by Mr. Justice Powell, the Court affirmed the view that the right of
cross-examination is more than a desirable rule of trial procedure,
and stated: "It is implicit in the constitutional right of confronta-
tion, and helps assure the 'accuracy of the truth-determining proc-
ess.'... It is, indeed, 'an essential and fundamental requirement
for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional
goal.' "
Taking up the voucher rule, the Court stated:
Although the historical origins of the "voucher" rule are uncertain, it ap-
pears to be a remnant of primitive English trial practice in which "oath-
takers" or "compurgators" were called to stand behind a particular party's
position in any controversy. Their assertions were strictly partisan and,
quite unlike witnesses in criminal trials today, their role bore little rela-
tion to the impartial ascertainment of the facts.
Whatever validity the "voucher" rule may have once enjoyed, and
apart from whatever usefulness it retains today in the civil trial process, it
bears little present relationship to the realities of the criminal process. It
might have been logical for the early common law to require a party to
vouch for the credibility of witnesses he brought before the jury to affirm
his veracity. Having selected them especially for that purpose, the party
might reasonably be expected to stand firmly behind their testimony.
But in modern criminal trials, defendants are rarely able to select their
witnesses: they must take them where they find them.
5 5
In a footnote the Court called attention to the rejection of the
voucher rule by Rule 607 of the newly proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence. 56 In Chambers, the Court decided that the voucher rule,
as applied in that case, "plainly interfered with Chambers' right to
defend against the State's charges"'57 and that thereby he was de-
nied due process in his trial.5 8
It has been noted that "Congress made no change in Rule 607,
and it was not the subject of floor debate. '5 9 It would appear that
the rule will not revolutionize federal practice. As a matter of his-
torical interest impeachment of one's own witness had previously
been allowed
where his testimony surprised the party calling him and was harmful to
his case, by having the judge call the witness, by allowing the impeach-
ment of compulsory witnesses, adverse parties in civil cases, government
agents called by defendants in criminal cases in the Second Circuit, wit-
nesses in civil cases by their depositions, by permitting a party limited
scope to bring out damaging matter about a witness on direct examina-
Rules of Evidence were approved by the Supreme Court on November 20,
1972, and sent to the Congress. The Chambers case was decided February 21,
1973.
54. Id. at 295.
55. Id. at 296 (footnotes omitted).
56. Id. at 296 n.9.
57. Id. at 298.
58. Id.
59. 3 J. WEiNsTEiN & M. BERGER, EVIDENCE T 607, at 607-1 (1977).
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tion, by allowing the accuracy of the testimony to be contradicted by ex-
trinsic evidence, and by getting the impeaching evidence before the jury
in the guise of refreshing the witness' recollection.
60
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, on February 19, 1971,61 con-
cluded that the traditional explanation that a party held out his
own witnesses as worthy of belief was no longer tenable, and that
"Parties, including the State, often have no real free choice in se-
lecting witnesses. We abandon the rule; credibility of a witness
may be attacked by any party, including the party calling him.1
6 2
The court cited, with other authority, the Advisory Committee's
1969 preliminary draft of Rule 6-07.63
As a member of the Advisory Committee, I would be derelict in
not calling attention to the fact that the Committee in proposing
Rule 6-07 had also proposed a change in the rule relating to the
effect of the receipt in evidence of inconsistent statements, which
was well summarized in its note to the original draft.6 The Com-
mittee note stated: "Prior inconsistent statements traditionally
have been admissible to impeach but not as substantive evidence.
Under the rule they are substantive evidence."65
The proposed change was not adopted. On some other occasion,
the reasons for the proposal and for its rejection can be discussed.
V. CONCLUSION
Reason and experience develop much of the law of evidence.
Any advisory committee on rules of evidence will soon find itself
deeply indebted to the law schools for the collection and discus-
sion of the experience of the bench, as shown by the reported
cases, and for the reasoning contained in law review articles,
whether supportive or critical of the rulings of the courts. It is to
be hoped that the law schools will continue to have teachers like
David Dow and that the bench and bar will be listening when they
speak.
60. I. at 607-13 to -14 (footnotes omitted).
61. State v. Fronning, 186 Neb. 463, 183 N.W.2d 920 (1971).
62. Id. at 465, 183 N.W.2d at 921.
63. Id.
64. See author's file, .supra note 19, Comments to Rule 6-07 at 90.
65. FaD. . Evm. 801(d) (1) (A), Adv. Comm. Note; Comment, supra note 39, at
1266 n.78 (1969).
